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HIGH-TECH COMPANIES AND THE
DECISION TO “GO PUBLIC”: ARE
BACKDOOR LISTINGS (STILL) AN
ALTERNATIVE TO “FRONT-DOOR”
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS?
Erik P.M. Vermeulen*
INTRODUCTION
Financial and capital markets play a key role in the funding of
high growth technology companies. There is little doubt that
companies in highly capital-intensive, often volatile, and disruptive
sectors will eventually have to float their shares on a stock exchange to
obtain access to capital to grow and expand their operations, enhance
the company’s reputation and visibility, attract and retain talented
employees, and provide liquidity to shareholders. The traditional path
to a listing in an equity market is an initial public offering (IPO).
However, the companies that consider a first sale of stock to the public
are often overwhelmed by the costly and time-consuming legal and
financial regulations that must be complied with while pursuing an
IPO.
These costly and lengthy regulatory barriers, together with
sluggish IPO markets and their unavailability to smaller firms, have
been reasons for high-tech companies and their shareholders to look
for alternatives to IPOs.1 A popular alternative is to pursue a backdoor

* Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Professor of Business and Financial Law at
Tilburg Law School, Tilburg Law & Economics Center, the Netherlands. Senior
Counsel Corporate at Philips, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
1
See Stephen Bell, As IPOs Struggle in Australia, Reverse Takeovers Shine,
WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. AUSTL. (Jan. 23, 2013, 11:52 AM),
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listing, most often accomplished through a reverse merger or reverse
takeover.2 Both alternatives “transform” a private company into a
publicly traded company by combining directly or indirectly with a
listed company (whether through a merger, exchange offer, or
otherwise). A backdoor listing has not only allowed companies to
focus more on their business and less on compliance with “going
public” rules and regulations, but also to gain access to more liquid and
robust stock markets. In addition to the cheaper and quicker access to
capital and liquidity, backdoor listings have also been employed to
receive tax benefits that stem from “tax loss carry-forwards” in the
public shell. If the reverse merger or takeover involves a public
company that operates in the same or complementary industry or
sector as the private company, synergies are often the reason for the
backdoor listings. Moreover, besides the fact that a private company
becomes instantly “listed” on a stock exchange, a backdoor listing
usually gives shareholders of the private company the opportunity to
receive the majority of the shares of the public entity, allowing them a
tight grip on control (as if they still run a private company).3
Recently, backdoor listings have become increasingly popular
among high-tech companies in the United States. Consider venture
capital-backed RMG Networks, a Chicago-based global provider of
smart visual solutions (particularly advertisements on airplanes and
airport lounges), which went public through a reverse merger in the
United States in April 2013, bypassing the IPO procedures. RMG
Networks was first acquired by SCG Financial Acquisition
Corporation. As a result, the shareholders of RMG Networks received

http://blogs.wsj.com/dealjournalaustralia/2013/01/23/as-ipos-struggle-reversetakeovers-shine/.
2
The terms “backdoor listing,” “reverse merger,” and “reverse takeover”
are used interchangeably. These three approaches, mostly distinguished by legal
differences at their implementation stage, are alternatives to an IPO.
3
See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012). See
also DAVID N. FELDMAN, REVERSE MERGERS: TAKING A COMPANY PUBLIC
WITHOUT AN IPO (2006).
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stock in SCG. Subsequently, the listed company’s profile was changed
from SCG to RMG.4
Australia also experienced a surge in high-tech backdoor
listings in 2014.5 For instance, Australian Bitcoin focused company
digitalBTC (which was acquired by the already listed Macro Energy
and renamed to DigitalCC Limited) is another example of a high-tech
(and disruptive) company that turned to a backdoor listing to go public
in 2014.
Backdoor listings are also a common “IPO alternative” in the
real estate development sector. For instance, in October 2013, the
Hong Kong Parkview Group Limited acquired the commercial
property portfolio in China from the non-listed subsidiary of Cofco
Corporation and changed its name to Cofco Land Holdings Ltd.6
Since backdoor listings are often not excessively burdened by
complex listing rules and regulations, they are prone to fraud and
abuse. Certainly, there are probably more examples of instances where
a backdoor listing has been a prudent and effective alternative to an
IPO. However, there is also evidence suggesting that lower quality
firms pursue listings through a reverse merger. It is therefore not
surprising that policymakers and regulators have recently introduced
(or are considering) special rules and regulations that govern backdoor
listings. These rules and regulations vary depending on each country’s
respective experience with this “going public” alternative.
This paper attempts to shed light on the question of whether
and when a backdoor listing is still a sustainable alternative to the
“front door” IPO. There is no clear-cut answer to this question. For
instance, stringent and complex rules and procedures for reverse
See Sean Ludwig, Digital Signage Biz RMG Networks Goes Public at $10 a
Share in Reverse Merger, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 8, 2013, 1:36 PM),
http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/08/rmg-networks-goes-public-reverse-merger/.
5
See Paul Garvey, ASIC Snarls at Backdoor Listings, AUSTL. BUS. REV. (July
31, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/asic-snarls-atbackdoor-listings/story-e6frg8zx-1227007785116.
6
See Esther Fung, Chinese Developers Take the Backdoor to Hong Kong Listings,
WALL
ST.
J.:
MONEYBEAT
(July
1,
2013,
10:00
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/01/chinese-developers-take-thebackdoor-to-hong-kong-listings/.
4
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mergers can be found in the United States due to the scandals
surrounding backdoor listings involving Chinese companies,
significantly reducing the attractiveness of backdoor listings. Sweden,
which has minimal experience with the backdoor listing phenomenon,
has adopted a more moderate (hybrid) approach that combines a caseby-case determination of the applicable rules with a system designed
to create awareness among investors about suspicious backdoor listing
activities. More specifically, the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm has the
potential to give a reverse merger company a temporary “observation
status” to alert investors about the risks and uncertainties associated
with a backdoor listing. Theoretically, Swedish companies that are
unable or unwilling to conduct an IPO (for instance, due to eligibility
issues and/or a sluggish IPO market) would still have access to capital
and/or liquidity more quickly and with fewer costs compared to their
U.S. counterparts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides an overview
of the general trends and facts regarding backdoor listings in countries
with a history of alternative public offerings, such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Australia. Section II discusses the general
perception of backdoor listings from the perspective of high-tech
companies. Since the availability of the IPO alternative also depends
on the applicable rules and regulations, Section III compares
regulatory responses to backdoor listings in the United States,
Australia, and Sweden. Section IV provides a glimpse into the future
of backdoor listings by taking into account the changing policy and
regulatory landscape designed to make it easier for young high-tech
companies to trade on stock exchanges. In fact, in an effort to spur
economic growth and job creation, policymakers, regulators, and
exchange operators are increasingly unveiling measures to relax rules
and regulations governing IPOs. This is illustrated by the signing of
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) in the United
States on April 5, 2012. The Act introduces the Emerging Growth
Company (EGC) status. Companies that are able to secure EGC status
will be offered a transition period (or an “on-ramp” period) during
which they are exempted from a number of regulatory requirements
associated with going public. Such speedier and cheaper IPO process
will have a reductive effect on the total number of backdoor listings,
but will not make them completely obsolete.
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TRENDS AND FACTS REGARDING BACKDOOR LISTINGS

Companies need capital as they go through the stages of their
life cycles. These life cycles typically start with turning an idea into a
start-up company. The start-up company attempts to raise capital from
venture capital funds and other private investors. These investors
support the start-up by contributing money and services, which brings
the company to the next stage in its development. Ideally, this
continues until the moment the company seeks to raise capital from
the “public” by pursuing an IPO, giving private investors and venture
capitalists an opportunity to gradually exit their investment.
The IPO, however, triggers the obligation to comply with a
plethora of rules and regulations required by regulators to protect the
shareholders (and other stakeholders) in listed companies and prevent
managerial misbehavior. These rules and regulations can be divided
into three categories: (1) listing requirements to determine whether a
company is eligible to go public; (2) disclosure and transparency rules
to provide financial and other information to the market and to
enhance investor confidence; and (3) corporate governance
requirements to ensure that the company’s affairs are conducted in the
interests of all concerned. Clearly, the regulatory framework makes the
process of an IPO expensive and time-consuming. The costs of an
IPO include the fees paid to investment banks, accountants, auditors,
lawyers, and other service providers and consultants for advice and for
preparing the registration statements, prospectus, and other legal
documents. Low valuations and disappointing IPO performances are
also reasons for companies to forego the IPO route.7
It is therefore probably not surprising that companies that
need capital to fund growth and/or provide liquidity to investors have
always been looking for quicker, cheaper, and more flexible
alternatives to get access to stock markets. When it comes to floating
the shares, the idea of avoiding the costs and complexities associated
with IPOs is certainly very appealing, particularly to companies that
operate in volatile, frequently changing, and quickly evolving markets,

See Stacy Lawrence, Reverse Mergers Attract Top-Tier Biotechs in Sluggish IPO
Market, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 598 (2006).
7
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such as the Bitcoin industry.8 Moreover, control over the timing of the
listing and the information released about the IPO process is usually
very important to these companies. Clearly, control over both the
timing and the information not only enables a smoother transition
from the non-listed status to being listed on public markets, but also
provides these companies with the opportunity to withdraw their plans
without alerting the public. Backdoor listings, particularly through
reverse mergers or reverse takeovers, are examples of these alternatives
to IPOs that have gained popularity in recent decades. These
alternatives, however, are often subject to controversy because an
increasing number of alternative listings fail to meet the expectations
of investors in the post-listing period.
Indeed, the growing trend of using backdoor listings is not
necessarily the consequence of a shift toward a more preferable listing
option. Literature denouncing reverse mergers as a suitable substitute
to IPOs is plentiful, and some venture so far as to say that they are not
even comparable. For instance, a recent empirical study argues that
going public via an IPO is simply not feasible for many companies that
do not exhibit significant growth potential, do not meet minimum
revenue and income levels, or are unable to convince an investment
bank (typically the gatekeepers to the public) to underwrite its offering.
The study also shows that most reverse merger companies begin
trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets.9 It should be noted that
gaining access to traditional forms of additional capital and ensuring a
liquid market for shares that typically come along with an IPO listing
are virtually non-existent when pursuing a reverse merger. Therefore,
a backdoor listing does not always facilitate a large infusion of new
capital from new investors because it is inherently not a capital-raising
endeavor where there is exchange of cash for shares in the
transaction.10 This observation raises the question of why a high-tech
company should pursue a backdoor listing.

8
See Peter Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, Choice between
Alternative Routes to Go Public: Backdoor Listing versus IPO, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
ON IPOS, 503, 503-30 (Mario Levis and Silvio Vismara eds., 2010).
9
See Charles M. C. Lee, Kevin K. Li & Ran Zhang, Shell Games: Are Chinese
Reverse Merger Firms Inherently Toxic? (Working Paper No. 3063, 2014).
10
See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 743 (2008).

426

2015

Vermeulen

4:1

In this respect, it is remarkable that although backdoor listings
occur on a global scale, there are significant differences between the
characteristics, motivations, and implications of these listing options.
These differences can be explained to a large extent by differences in
the legal framework applicable to backdoor listings, and also by supplydemand dynamics (the market for backdoor listings). For instance,
backdoor listings through reverse mergers have become an attractive
alternative to an IPO in the United States throughout the previous
decade. The number of reverse mergers was even higher than the
number of regular IPOs in 2008.11
In a reverse merger, a private company that wishes to go public
through the “backdoor” merges with a public shell. Clearly, in order to
maintain the trading status, the public shell must survive the merger,
which explains the term “reverse.” As mentioned above, trades in the
public shell companies are usually carried out through electronic
quotation venues such as the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board
(OTCBB) or the “Pink Sheets” system (referring to the color of the
paper the quotations were printed on). This over-the-counter (OTC)
market mainly deals in low-grade securities issued by firms in economic
distress or in “microcap” issues that fail to qualify for a regular listing
on a stock exchange. Most of the shares traded in these OTC markets
are of such low value—many of which are “penny stock” shares
trading under U.S.D. $1 each—that they become perfect targets for
reverse mergers.
It should be noted that backdoor listings in the United States
are often accomplished through a reverse triangular merger instead of
a direct merger. This form of merger enables the parties to circumvent
expensive and time-consuming disclosures under the listing rules and
securities regulations. Under reverse triangular mergers, the publicly
listed company typically creates a new wholly owned subsidiary, which
subsequently merges into the private company. The merger must be
approved by the public shell (as shareholder of its new subsidiary) and
the shareholders of the private company. Approval from the
shareholders of the public shell company can be avoided if the

The number of reverse mergers was even higher than the number of
regular IPOs in 2008. See Igor Semenenko, Reverse Merger Waves, Market Timing and
Managerial Behavior, 2 INT’L RES. J. OF APPLIED FIN. 1453 (2011).
11
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company trades on the OTCBB. As a result of the merger, the private
company becomes the wholly owned subsidiary of the public shell,
which in return issues shares to the shareholders of the private
company. At the final stage, the name of the shell is usually changed
to the name of the private company, and the directors and officers of
the listed shell are replaced by those of the private company.
Regardless of how effective reverse mergers might be for meeting the
needs of a broad range of companies, the lack of regulatory scrutiny
has clearly caused increasing concerns about the degree to which these
mergers are used as a means of committing fraud or other securities
violations, particularly in terms of misleading financial statements.
In other jurisdictions, supply and demand dynamics, rather
than the lack of rules and regulations, explain the popularity of
backdoor listings strategies and arrangements. Consider the Australian
Stock Exchange (ASX), which is dominated by the volatile mining and
high-tech sectors. Companies seeking access to the capital market have
almost always been able to find a financially distressed listed vehicle
that could serve as a shell for a backdoor listing. For instance, hightech companies in Australia are often able to obtain the listed status
through shell companies that are active in the mining industry.
Undoubtedly, some of these high-tech companies have or will become
targets themselves and are thus fundamental in attaining the backdoor
listing aspirations of new mining companies.12 Recent data on
backdoor listings confirms this cycle: while seventy-six percent of the
Australian backdoor listings were conducted by mining companies in
2012,13 there was a surge in backdoor listings by high tech companies
(using unloved mining shells) in the first half of 2014.
Finally, in the United Kingdom, backdoor listings are often
used by companies that (1) are mainly interested in the synergies that
can be achieved by merging with (or taking over) a listed operating
company (this is often combined with raising new capital), and (2) seek
access to a wider exposure to investors and liquidity when the IPO
market is weak. What is interesting about the experience of the United
See Owen Richards, How Primary and Secondary Markets Work, ASX
INVESTOR UPDATE (2012) (on file with author).
13
See Stephen Bell, ‘Back Door’ May Be Closing for Miners, WALL ST. J.: DEAL
JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/01/30/backdoor-may-be-closing-for-miners/.
12
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Kingdom is that it shows that specific rules and regulations do not
necessarily make backdoor listings less attractive. On the contrary, the
“backdoor listing” practice in the United Kingdom was more
widespread than in the United States.14 However, alleged irregularities
at subsidiaries of Bumi, an Indonesian company that listed on the
London Stock Exchange through a reverse merger in the summer of
2011,15 quickly gave a negative notion to backdoor listings. This,
together with the fact that the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—
now the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)—introduced new rules
with the aim to prevent reverse takeovers of companies that are not
eligible for listing, explains the sudden decline in the use and popularity
of backdoor listings in 2012.16 The experiences in the three countries
show that, besides the applicable rules and regulations, the general
perception regarding backdoor listings also appears to play a role in
determining whether a backdoor listing provides a viable alternative to
high-tech companies that seek to float their shares.
II.

THE GENERAL PERCEPTION OF BACKDOOR LISTINGS

It is a common refrain that backdoor listings are prone to abuse
and inappropriate transactions. In the early days of the reverse merger
practice (1970s and 1980s) in the United States, a number of
opportunistic promoters were fraudulently establishing new shell
companies that subsequently raised capital through their IPOs.17 After
the shell company was established, they leaked speculative information
about an upcoming (reverse) merger to the market in the hope that the
stock price would rise, which would then give them the opportunity to
sell shares and make a significant profit. In response to this fraudulent
See Peter Roosenboom & Willem Schramade, Reverse Mergers in the United
Kingdom: Listed Targets and Private Acquirers, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS ACTIVITY SINCE 1990: RECENT RESEARCH AND QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 181, 182 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Luc Renneboog eds., 2007).
15
See David Oakley, City Watchdog to Tighten Listing Rules, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
2, 2012, 9:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2709378-0c8c-11e2-a73c00144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a.
16
Sylvia Pfeifer, Genel Faces Delay to Premium Listing Plan, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
23 2012, 7:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6dedca2c-5e44-11e1-85f600144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a.
17
See Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends – A Critique of Reverse Merger
Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475 (2006).
14
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practice, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed a
number of amendments to the Securities Act 1933 in 1992. The most
important rule in this context is Rule 419. This Rule introduced a
“blank check company,” which is defined as a company that: (i) is a
development stage company that has no specific business plan or
purpose or has indicated that its business plan is to engage in a merger
or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, or other
entity or person; and (ii) is issuing “penny stock.” Rule 419 introduced
special rules for blank check companies. For instance, Rule 419
required virtually all cash raised during the IPO to be placed in escrow.
Furthermore, under Rule 419, blank check companies were prohibited
from trading in the shell’s stock prior to a reverse merger. Rule 419
also introduced a time limit of eighteen months to complete a
transaction, and failure to do so would lead to a return of the invested
cash to the shareholders.18
The regulatory restrictions on blank check companies are the
reason for the emergence of Special Purpose Acquisition Vehicles
(SPAC). Interestingly, SPACs largely mirror the blank check
companies of the 1980s that caused Congress to adopt Rule 419. The
business plan for a SPAC is simple. A SPAC is a shell company without
historical operations that was taken public through an IPO solely for
the purpose of acquiring an operating business, which is typically not
pre-determined prior to listing, within an eighteen to twenty four
month timeline. For entities looking to list through a reverse merger, a
SPAC can be a favorable partner by offering the operating company
an immediate cash infusion directly from the proceeds of the SPAC’s
IPO as well as a liquid trading market for its securities. Though a
merger with a SPAC eliminates the primary downsides associated with
a traditional reverse merger, this type of merger is often only a pipe
dream for less than exceptional operating companies, and the
likelihood of such a deal is at the whim of the SPAC’s management
group.
Despite the introduction of Rule 419 and the restrictions on
the use of SPACs, the reverse merger or reverse takeover was utilized
at a greater frequency as a mechanism to list publicly in the lead up to
2010. In fact, the number of reverse mergers eclipsed the IPO count
18

Offerings by Blank Check Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (1992).
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in 2008 for the first time in the United States. Clearly, there exists a
cohort of promulgating instances where the use of a reverse merger
has been effective. For instance, a reverse merger can be a viable
mechanism to tap into previously untapped sources of additional
capital for companies that have exhausted other financing options and
do not meet the demanding performance criteria necessary to pursue
an IPO. In such instance, the access to Private Investment in Public
Equity (PIPE) financing, which is excluded as a financing source for
private companies, becomes an important potential source of
invaluable capital for entities with no other viable alternatives.19 A track
record of institutional investments in underperforming public
companies with relatively illiquid stocks makes this financing option
not only a realistic avenue for smaller, less reputable entities, but also
a means to eventually obtain a listing in a higher segment of one of the
major stock exchanges.20
In addition to access to additional avenues of capital, a reverse
merger tends to be both a quicker and cheaper listing option relative
to its IPO counterpart. On average, a backdoor listing through a
reverse merger can be completed in as little as a couple of weeks and
is unquestionably timelier than an IPO, which can take months. This
is recently confirmed by the CEO of Bitcoin Shop, a U.S. company
that operates a Bitcoin-based e-commerce website, who stated (after
successfully concluding a reverse merger through which the company
raised U.S.D. $1.875 million in a private placement in February 2014)
that the reverse merger only took three weeks.21 From a cost
standpoint, IPOs can run a bill north of the six-figure mark while
reverse mergers can be done for a significantly lower amount under
the standard circumstances. However, it is important to qualify the
speed and cost effectiveness of a reverse merger as it is often touted as
See David N. Feldman, Reverse Mergers + PIPEs: The New Small-Cap IPO,
in PIPES: REVISED AND UPDATED EDITION—A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
IN PUBLIC EQUITY (Steven Dresner & E. Kurt Kim eds., 2005), reprinted in 3 BUS. L.
BRIEF 34 (2007).
20
See Helen Luk & Heda Bayron, Sneaking in Through the Back: Chinese
Companies that have used Reverse Mergers to List on U.S. Regulators are Finally Taking Notice
and Cosing the Door, A PLUS, May 2011, at 18.
21
See Bill Meagher, Bitcoin Retailer Raises $1.9M in Reverse Merger, THE DEAL
PIPELINE, (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/consumerretail/bitcoin-retailer-raises-19m-in-reverse-merger.php.
19
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a surefire benefit in favor of reverse mergers when that is not always
the case. In fact, reverse mergers on the slower end of the spectrum
(more than four months) can take as long as some IPOs. Additionally,
the cost argument in favor of a reverse merger becomes questionable
after factoring for the expenses associated with a backdoor listing
along with the consideration paid to shell promoters in the form of
cash and sometimes an equity stake.
High-tech companies that face difficulties in accessing
domestic capital markets and attracting funding to help them reach the
next stage in their development also use backdoor listings to enter a
foreign market. This is particularly true if stock exchanges have a
competitive interest in encouraging foreign listings. Consider the
Chinese companies that listed in the United States via reverse mergers.
According to data collected by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), 159 Chinese companies completed a
reverse merger between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010.22 Because
taking the reverse merger route let these companies avoid the scrutiny
that would otherwise be required by state and federal rules and
regulations in the United States, the reverse merger count
outnumbered the number of Chinese companies that completed an
IPO in the United States in the same period. Clearly, even though
legally accepted, this trend was only possible with the help of a network
of U.S. advisors and consultants, such as underwriters, investment
banks, lawyers, and auditors.23
Despite the benefits of reverse mergers, there is a notion of
adverse selection in the pool of entities pursuing a listing through the
“alternative” listing route. This notion is supported by the delisting of
forty-two percent of the entities listed via the backdoor within its first
three years.24 Reverse takeovers are typically exercised by smaller and
22
See PCAOB Issues First Research Note on Chinese Reverse Mergers, PUB. CO.
ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT
BD.,
(Mar.
14,
2011),
http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/03152011_ResearchNote.aspx.
23
David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, China to Wall Street: The Side-Door
Shuffle,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
23,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/business/global/reverse-mergers-givechinese-firms-a-side-door-to-wall-st.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
24
See Frederick Adjei, Ken B. Cyree & Mark M. Walker, The Determinants
and Survival of Reverse Mergers vs IPOs, 32 J. OF ECON. & FIN. 176, 189 (2008).
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lesser-known entities relative to their larger, more reputable
counterparts that list through an IPO, giving rise to a negative signaling
effect for those that elect to pursue a backdoor listing.25 This notion of
an adverse selection in entities pursuing a reverse merger is echoed in
the literature that showcases the decision tree that lay ahead of Chinese
companies, which account for a large majority of the reverse mergers
in the late 2000s, when pursuing a public listing.26 Empirical data
reveals that, despite the benefits of reverse mergers, the most wellknown and profitable Chinese companies generally elect to pursue an
IPO. By contrast, there are many examples of smaller Chinese entities
that listed through a reverse merger that are subject to a greater
frequency of class action lawsuits, are less profitable, exude lower
balance sheet liquidity, and are highly leveraged.27
Indeed, many of these Chinese companies ended up being sued
for securities law violations, particularly related to financial
misrepresentation, failure to disclose material facts, and/or deficient
internal control systems. Academic research reveals that U.S. listed
Chinese companies that pursued a reverse merger were not always in
compliance with the internationally accepted accounting standards.28
Customarily, the adoption of these standards is a prerequisite as well
as a requirement to maintain a public listing for entities pursuing a
reverse merger, regardless of the accounting practices employed in
local jurisdictions. This listing obligation underscores the growing
25
See Augusto Arellano-Ostoa & Sandro Brusco, Understanding Reverse
Mergers: A First Approach (Bus. Econ. Series 11, Working Paper No. 02-17, 2002),
available
at
http://orff.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/66/wb021711.pdf?sequence=1.
26
See Jan Jindra, Torben Voetmann & Ralph Walkling, Reverse Mergers: The
Chinese Experience (Working Paper No. 2012-03-018, 2014).
27
The 159 Chinese firms that pursued a reverse merger in the United
States in the period between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010 had a combined
market capitalization of U.S.D. $12.8 billion (which is less than fifty percent of the
market capitalization of the fifty-six Chinese companies that completed a U.S. IPO).
See Reverse Mergers: A Looming U.S.-China Showdown over Securities Regulation?, WHARTON
UNIV.
OF
PA.
(March
5,
2013),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/reverse-mergers-a-looming-u-schina-showdown-over-securities-regulation/.
28
See Katherine T. Zuber, Breaking Down a Great Wall: Chinese Reverse
Mergers and Regulatory Efforts to Increase Accounting Transparency, 102 GEO. L.J. 1307
(2014).
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importance of audits and places a tremendous amount of responsibility
on the auditors of these (often times) foreign entities because they
usually serve as the only safeguard between the foreign entity and
ensuring that domestic investors receive reliable statements.
What is remarkable in this respect is that filings with the SEC
reveal that Chinese reverse mergers tended to retain their own auditors
post-merger as opposed to those of the former shell company.29 Audit
quality concerns in these mergers were only to be expected when
compliance with PCAOB accounting standards increasingly faltered.
The large majority of accounting firms employed by Chinese reverse
mergers were only inspected by the PCAOB on a triennial basis rather
than the typical annual basis, which had only compounded concerns
over fraud whirling around Chinese reverse mergers. The questionable
audit quality and non-compliance has stemmed partially from added
difficulty for U.S. registered accounting firms to conduct
comprehensive audits on companies based abroad due to language
barriers, accounting standard discrepancies, use of under qualified
assistants, the lack of enforcement of accounting laws in China, and
additional expenses as well.
The negative attention regarding backdoor listings has caused
companies to look at other financing alternatives, such as direct private
placements or private sales.30 However, although poor performing
Chinese reverse merger companies are inextricably tied to the general
perception of reverse mergers, as they account for a large proportion
of entities pursuing backdoor listing through public shell companies,
research indicates that the negative spillover effects of fraudulent
activity or reporting by Chinese companies have not always harmed
other non-Chinese companies’ backdoor listing activities. Reverse
mergers involving non-Chinese entities appear to largely escape the
wrath of investors, as the stock market reaction to news of fraud is
focused on Chinese companies as opposed to questioning reverse

See Benjamin A. Templin, Chinese Reverse Mergers, Accounting Regimes, and
the Rule of Law in China, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 119 (2011).
30
See David Thomas, The IPO Road Less Traveled: Form 10,
BIOTECHNOW (Feb. 25, 2013) http://www.biotech-now.org/business-andinvestments/inside-bio-ia/2013/02/the-ipo-road-less-traveled-form-10.
29
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mergers in general as a viable mechanism to list publicly.31 Still, the
global turbulence in the credit markets, triggered by the turmoil in the
subprime mortgage market in 2007-2008, largely brought an end to the
laissez-faire era in the backdoor listing process. For instance, in
response to the scandals, U.S. policymakers introduced legislation that
subjects reverse mergers to registration requirements and provisions
targeted at improving the companies’ accountability. The backdoor
listings rules and regulations—and their impact on high-tech
companies—will be discussed in the next Section.
III.

REGULATORY IMPACT ON BACKDOOR LISTINGS

Regulatory responses to the increase in backdoor listings vary
significantly from country to country based on a country’s respective
experience in this area. These responses can be roughly split into three
distinct approaches.32 On one end of the spectrum, the United States
has undertaken a number of initiatives spearheaded by organizations
such as the SEC and the PCAOB to curb issues stemming from reverse
mergers in the form of issuing investor warnings and more stringent
listing rules for these transactions. On the other end of the spectrum,
Sweden has only limited experience with backdoor listings (and has yet
to express concern similar to that of the United States). However, to
ensure that investors have sufficient information to distinguish
between prudent and imprudent backdoor listings, the Rule Book of
OMX NASDAQ Stockholm contains a light touch signaling system
that enables regulators to give companies involved in backdoor listings
a temporary “observation status.”33 Regulatory responses worldwide to
the widely publicized backdoor listings/reverse mergers waver
between the approaches taken by the United States and Sweden, as
See Masako N. Darrough, Rong Huang & Sha Zhao, The Spillover Effect
of Chinese Reverse Merger Frauds: Chinese or Reverse Merger? (Working Paper, 2012).
32
Rather than making a strict distinction between the different regulatory
approaches, this Section argues that regulatory measures undertaken by national level
regulators are best seen in terms of a spectrum of possible regulatory paths. It ranges
from countries that introduced special rules and regulations for backdoor listings via
countries that implemented rules and regulations that treat backdoor listings as IPOs
to jurisdictions that adopted a more flexible regulatory approach.
33
See NASDAQ OMX STOCKHOLM, RULE BOOK FOR ISSUERS 17 r. 2.7
(2015), available at http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/96/96156_nasdaqstockholm-s-rule-book-for-issuers—-1-january-2015.pdf.
31
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evidenced by the changes (or lack thereof) in the respective listing rules
following these developments in Australia.
A. Special Rules and Regulations for Backdoor Listings
In light of the string of alleged fraudulent activity and
accounting gaffes concentrated within entities that have undertaken
reverse mergers in the latter portion of the 2000s, the SEC and the
PCAOB acted swiftly in an attempt to halt further incidents. In
addition to issuing an investor bulletin highlighting the additional
potential risks associated with investing in companies that were
engaged in a backdoor listing process,34 the SEC imposed a wave of
more stringent listing rules for determining if and when companies are
eligible to list publicly through the “backdoor.” Additional listing
requirements include maintaining a closing share price beyond a
certain threshold, complying with all periodic filing requirements of
financial reports, and having been traded in the United States on the
OTC market or another regulated exchange for at least one year prior
(“seasoning rules”).35 These amendments, which were ultimately
approved by the SEC in November 2011, aim to address the concerns
surrounding the inaccuracies of financial statements produced by
reverse merger companies.36
In addition, the PCAOB proposed to implement a set of
supplementary auditing standards in the fall of 2011 by requiring audit
reports to disclose and identify the names of audit firms or individuals
that provided more than three percent of the total hours spent on the
most recent audit.37 The rationale for this additional requirement is
See generally Investor Bulletin: Reverse Mergers, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June
2011), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf.
35
See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012).
36
See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Rules
to Toughen Listing Standards for Reverse Merger Companies (Nov. 9, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm.
37
Moreover, the PCAOB and China entered into a cooperative
agreement in October 2012 under which PCAOB inspectors are allowed to observe
the oversight activities of Chinese regulators. In return, the agreement allows the
Chinese regulators to observe the work of the PCAOB. See PCAOB Taking Steps to
Work with China, NASBA STATE BOARD REP., Oct. 2012, at 2, available at
http://www.nasba.org/files/2012/10/OctoberSBR_2012.pdf.
34
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twofold. First and foremost, such a standard helps fulfill consistent
requests from investors for further information about the firms that
are performing audits on their investments. Second, the names of
auditing firms that are located in jurisdictions beyond the PCAOB’s
current investigatory scope is publicized under this mandate and hence
allows investors to be better informed about the quality of firms
conducting a company’s auditing. This is particularly relevant in China
where the PCAOB and other foreign regulatory bodies are currently
barred from inspecting China-based audit firms on grounds of
sovereignty and state secrecy. Though the PCAOB has been trying to
further cooperation with jurisdictions, such as China, which are
particularly salient and which make up almost five percent of the
PCAOB registered firms, additional measures, including the
publication of the names of foreign auditing firms, are useful steps
toward greater transparency in audit practices in favor of investors.
The impact of the seasoning rules and regulatory scrutiny on
“backdoor listings” is significant. Data provider PrivateRaise recorded
257 reverse mergers in 2010. After the introduction of the rules, the
number decreased to “only” 124 companies in 2013.38 Interestingly,
U.S. healthcare and biotech companies are increasingly willing to
pursue a backdoor listing despite the seasoning rules. The benefits of
the informal and flexible reverse merger process often outweigh the
costs of applying the more cumbersome seasoning rules. According to
data provider PrivateRaise, at least sixty-nine companies have availed
themselves of the reverse merger option during the first half of 2014,
and most of these companies were healthcare and biotech companies.39
Surprisingly (recall that a backdoor listing is inherently not a capitalraising endeavor), twenty-eight companies in these reverse merger

38
See Bill Meagher, Alternative Public Offering Market Is Booming, THE DEAL
PIPELINE
(Feb.
24,
2014,
1:58
PM),
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/alternative-public-offering-marketis-booming.php.
39 Bill Meagher, Investment in Reverse Mergers Doubled in Second Quarter, The
Deal Pipeline (July 21, 2014, 2:43 PM),
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/investment-in-reverse-mergersdoubled-in-second-quarter.php.
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transactions were also able to raise a respectable total of U.S.D. $85.6
million in private placements.40
B. Re-Compliance Regulation
In contrast to the United States, the financial regulatory body
in Australia has had a rather tepid response to the wave of fraudulent
backdoor listings. In fact, the Listing Rules of the Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX) makes no specific references to backdoor listings or
reverse takeovers. However, ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 12,
which was published in December 2013 and revised in October 2014,
provides legal certainty for the companies and their advisors by
explaining how backdoor listings are regulated under Listing Rules 11.1
(including 11.1.2 and 11.1.3), 11.2, and 11.3.41 The Australian Securities
Exchange generally compels a listed entity involved in a backdoor
listing to re-adhere to listing requirements under ASX Listing Rule 11.1
(proposed change to nature or scale of activities).42 Non-compliance
with the listing rules could lead to a suspension of the quotation.
Exceptions to the re-admission process exist only if the
backdoor listing does not constitute a significant change to the nature
or scale of the activities of the listed company. However, a close
reading of the previously mentioned Guidance Note 12 shows that the
most common backdoor listings will lead to a significant change in the
nature of an entity’s activity.43 The following activities (associated with
the mining industry) are explicitly mentioned in the Guidance Note:
(1) an entity whose main business activity is manufacturing consumer
goods deciding to switch its main business activity to mining
exploration (or vice versa); and (2) an entity whose main business
activity is exploring for minerals deciding to switch its main business
activity to exploring for oil and gas.44 As for the scale of the activities,
the ASX considers a twenty-five percent change to the size of an
entity’s operations to be significant. It therefore comes as no surprise
that empirical research found that approximately seventy-nine percent

40
41
42
43
44

Id.
ASX Listing Rules, ch. 12 (Austl. Sec. Exch. 2014).
Id. at ch. 11.1.
Id. at ch. 12.
Id.
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of the backdoor listings that took place between 1992 and 2007 would
have been required to re-comply with ASX’s listing requirements.45
However, the recently revised Guidance Note 12 arguably
makes backdoor listings more appealing to high-tech companies by
giving the ASX more flexibility and leeway in interpreting the readmission rules. For instance, Guidance Note 12 includes more
flexible policies on the requirements regarding the minimum spread of
security holders (usually 400 shareholders each holding shares with a
minimum value of AUD $2,000). Guidance Note 12 also has a “20
cent rule,” which requires—with few exceptions—that shares (or other
securities) offered as part of a backdoor listing should have a minimum
issue price or sale price of A.U.D. twenty cents or more per share.
Clearly, the ASX Guidance Notes not only increase the compliance
rate with the regulatory requirements, but also enhance legal certainty
and limit possible abuse of the rules, while taking the specifics of
backdoor listings into account.
C. A Light Touch—Flexible—Regulatory Approach to Backdoor
Listings
The Listing Rules of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm also
embrace flexibility in assessing backdoor listing processes. First, Rule
3.3.8 requires listed companies to disclose information to the market
about significant changes in its identity.46 The information must be
equivalent to what is required under the IPO regulations. In order to
determine whether there is a significant change in identity, the Swedish
regulator typically takes the following criteria into account: (1) changes
in ownership structure, (2) the acquisition of a new business, and (3)
the change in market value of the listed company following an
acquisition. What is interesting is that the exchange has the possibility
to give a company’s shares a temporary “observation status” if the
disclosed information is insufficient. The rationale behind this status is
straightforward: it provides information to the market and warns
investors and potential investors of the risks and uncertainties
associated with the company or its shares. The observation status is a
flexible, but powerful mechanism to remind investors to be cautious
45
46

See Philip Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, supra note 8.
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, supra note 33, at r. 3.3.8.
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about investing in companies that are subject to a reverse takeover.47
The observation status can only be granted for a limited period of time,
usually not more than six months.
Clearly, other measures in backdoor listing procedures
available to the Swedish regulator are the cancellation or suspension of
the trading in the shares of a listed company. However, if the regulator
is of the opinion that more drastic interventions are necessary,
flexibility remains an important element in the regulator’s decisionmaking process. Consider Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc., the
byproduct of a reverse merger between a privately held Israeli based
bio-pharmaceutical company (Immune Pharmaceuticals Limited) with
a listed American developer in pain and cancer treatment (EpiCept
Corporation).48 The newly merged entity hoped to achieve a public
listing on the NASDAQ OMX in Sweden following the transaction.49
It also intended to list on a U.S. securities exchange. Daniel Teper,
Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. Chairman and CEO, highlighted the
limitations for Israeli capital markets to fulfill the financing needs of
companies operating within the life sciences space that are not
concurrently listed in the United States as the primary cause for
pursuing a public listing.50 A reverse merger was ultimately elected as
the mechanism to list, since an IPO was initially not a feasible option
at the time of the consummation of the merger.
However, even though an active listed company (such as
EpiCept), as opposed to a shell company, was involved in the reverse
merger, the newly merged Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. was not
immediately allowed to maintain its listing on the regulated NASDAQ
OMX market in Sweden. Instead, the regulators approved trading of
the shares of Immune Pharmaceutical Inc. on NASDAQ OMX First
Id. at r. 2.7(v).
See Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Immune Pharmaceuticals’ Common Stock
Approved for Trading on NASDAQ OMX First North Premier, NASDAQ
GLOBALNEWSWIRE
(November
26,
2013,
00:38
AM),
http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2013/11/26/592383/0/en/ImmunePharmaceuticals-Common-Stock-Approved-for-Trading-on-NASDAQ-OMXFirst-North-Premier.html?parent=591162.
49 Id.
50 See Gali Weinreb, Immune Pharmaceuticals Lists in US, Sweden After Reverse
Merger, GLOBES (Oct. 5, 2015 8:30 PM), http://www.globes.co.il/en/article1000870466.
47
48
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North Premier, a market for high growth companies that are in the
process of preparing for a listing at the main market.51 This decision
reflects the importance of the introduction of less regulated and more
accessible segments to smaller high-tech companies that would
otherwise consider entering the market through the backdoor. The
impact of segmented stock markets on high-tech companies and
backdoor listings will be discussed in Section IV.
IV.

SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS FOR HIGH GROWTH
COMPANIES AND BACKDOOR LISTINGS

The Swedish experience indicates that the outlook for
backdoor listings is dismal when high-tech companies can list on an
accessible, vibrant, liquid, and high-growth market. The question,
however, is whether the benefits of such a market are large enough for
high-tech companies to completely turn away from the backdoor
listing route to the stock market. What is important in this respect is
the gradually changing regulatory landscape for companies that
consider floating their shares on a stock exchange. Policymakers and
regulators have introduced (or plan to introduce) more flexible listing
rules and regulations to stimulate IPO activity by high-tech
companies.52 These initiatives appear to be successful. For instance,
the increase of the number of high tech IPOs in the United States in
2013 and the first half of 2014 could arguably be attributed to the
possibility of a firm to qualify as an emerging growth company (EGC)
under the JOBS Act.53
The EGC label offers several benefits to high growth
companies in the pre- and post-IPO period. In the pre-IPO period, an
EGC will only be required to include two years—instead of the usually

Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 48.
For example, in February 2015 the European Commission started a
consultation process expected to evolve into a E.U.-wide Capital Markets Union.
The idea is that a small company’s access to financing would be significantly
improved in a more harmonized capital market. See Commission Green Paper on Building
a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final (February 18, 2015).
53
See generally Gillian Tett, Investors Enjoy a Sweet Aftertaste to the Candy Crush
Crunch,
FIN.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2014,
5:30
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/39e3e9ba-b418-11e3-a102-00144feabdc0.html.
51
52
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required three years—of audited statements in its IPO registration.54
More importantly, the special status introduces “testing-the-waters”
provisions, which allow EGCs to communicate with professional
investors (qualified institutional buyers or institutional accredited
investors) to determine investors’ interest in the company prior to or
following the date of the IPO registration statement.55 Moreover, the
JOBS Act provides these companies with the possibility to
confidentially submit a draft of its IPO registration statement for
review to the SEC.56
Also, the “on-ramp” provisions grant important reliefs in the
post-IPO period. For example, EGCs are exempted from the
obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b) to provide an
auditor attestation of internal control.57 Furthermore, the Act excludes
EGCs from (1) complying with the full range of executive
compensation disclosures and (2) say-on-pay votes on executive
compensation.58 Finally, EGCs need not comply with any new or
revised accounting standards until the date on which private
companies are required to apply these standards to their organization.
The success of the JOBS Act is reflected by the significant increase in
the number of EGCs that have pursued a listing after having used the
option to confidentially file their registration statements. According to
data provider Renaissance Capital, approximately seventy to eighty
percent of the 222 IPO companies (including non-venture capital
backed companies) in 2013 have availed themselves of the JOBS Act’s
confidential filing provision.59 This is not surprising since high-tech
companies value increased control over the timing of the IPO, which
is arguably provided by a confidential filing, more than the likely
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), H.R. 3606, 112th
Cong. § 102 (2012) (enacted).
55
Id. at §105.
56
Id. at §106.
57
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 404(b)
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002)).
54

58
Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 953(b)(1) (2010) (codified in 15 U.S.C. 78l note).
59
See David Gelles & Michael J. De La Merced, ‘The New Normal’ for Tech
Companies and Others: The Stealth I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (February 9, 2014:
8:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/the-new-normal-for-techcompanies-and-others-the-stealth-i-p-o/?_r=0.
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discount in the stock price due to the reduced disclosure and reporting
requirements for EGCs.
Clearly, the JOBS Act is a success, but will it send the backdoor
listing option to oblivion? It is already evident that high-tech
companies have started to consider the IPO option again in the United
States. In 2014, 116 high-tech (and venture capital-backed) companies
floated their shares, compared to eighty-five companies in 2013.60
However, despite the booming high growth market segment in the
United States, there has been a surge in reverse mergers, particularly
conducted by companies that operate in volatile industries. As
discussed, despite the need to comply with onerous special reverse
merger regulation, these companies still find that a reverse merger is
quicker and easier than conducting a traditional IPO (even under the
JOBS Act).
CONCLUSION
In the previous decade, backdoor listings became increasingly
popular as a mechanism to list publicly in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia. However, empirical studies indicate that
backdoor listing activity has significantly decreased due to negative
publicity, the introduction of more stringent rules and regulations, and
increased regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, the question is whether
measures employed to strengthen the rules and regulations governing
backdoor listings will eventually put an end to this alternative option
of going public. The evidence is mixed. The number of and amount
raised by Chinese reverse mergers has plunged approximately fiftythree percent and ninety-five percent respectively in 2011 (compared
to 2010). In contrast, we observe a backdoor listing boom in the hightech industry in the United States and Australia in 2014.
The answers to the question of whether backdoor listing is still
a sustainable alternative for high-tech companies compared to the
“front door” IPO vary depending on a country’s respective experience
with backdoor listings. These answers can be divided into four
categories. In the first category, there are countries such as the United
States that have a vibrant, accessible, and liquid stock market for high60

See PitchBook, 2Q 2015 U.S. VENTURE INDUSTRY REPORT (2015).
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tech companies as well as a long history with backdoor listings. In such
countries, high-tech companies are willing to accept more stringent
rules, such as the seasoning rules, if the backdoor listing strategy still
offers them flexibility as well as low-cost and timing advantages
compared to the regular IPO route.
Second, in countries such as Australia, which has no special
high-tech segment on the stock exchange but has an active market for
alternative listings, backdoor listings are there to stay even during the
gloomiest days of the economy. Policymakers and regulators seem to
understand the importance of alternative public offerings by allowing
flexibility in the application of the “re-admission” rules.
The third category includes countries that have a robust and
liquid high-tech stock market, but no recent experience with backdoor
listings. The Swedish experience shows that, even though backdoor
listings are permitted, high-tech companies rarely employ this
alternative option. This can partly be explained by the lack of available
shell companies.
Fourth, even if countries have no history with backdoor
listings, policymakers and regulators should be wary of the fact that
entrepreneurial high-tech companies may start to explore alternative
public offerings if the high-tech segment of the stock market is not
accessible through relatively cheap and fast means. They should realize
that backdoor listings continue to provide a viable and legitimate listing
option for high-tech companies that are always in search for capital
and liquidity.
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